The Participation of “Civil Society” in Regionalism and Peacebuilding in the Pacific Island Countries

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Introduction

Since the 1980s, armed conflict has continually occurred in the Pacific Island Countries which are the members of the Pacific Islands Forum (hereafter the Forum)\(^1\). In particular, two consecutive coups, the first one in Fiji in May 2000 and the second one in Solomon Islands two weeks later, proved the political instability of the region. The situation was described as “from an ‘oasis of democracy’ to an ‘arc of instability’” (Reilly and Wainwright, 2005:125).

In order to respond to the conflicts, the Forum adopted the Biketawa Declaration at its annual meeting in October 2000\(^2\), which defined the guiding principles and courses of actions to be taken by the Forum in case of political crises in the region. Based on the Biketawa Declaration, the Forum sent the election observer missions and eminent persons groups to Solomon Islands and Fiji. In July 2003, the first regional military intervention was launched in Solomon Islands and was followed by the establishment of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)\(^3\).

Even though the situation has moved away from armed fighting, it is not easy to deny the possibility of the recurrence of conflict. It is also possible that a new conflict could break out in a different place. To date, short-term and ad hoc actions, such as election observer missions and military intervention, have not been enough to detour the outbreak of new conflict. Long-term and structural actions, like the participation of “civil society” in regionalism, are needed to build longer and more stable peace.
So far, the Forum has conducted regionalism as an inter-state cooperation of member countries. This article focuses on the attempts of the Forum to promote the participation of “civil society” in regionalism, as long-term and structural actions for building peace in the Pacific Island Countries, and presents their prospects for building peace in the Pacific Island Countries.

1. The Conflicts in the Pacific Island Countries

1) Diversity and Fragmentation in the Pacific Island Countries

The Pacific Island Countries are characterized by wide diversity and the fragmentation caused by it. Among three sub-regions in the Pacific Island Countries (Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia), Melanesia is particularly regarded as “one of the world’s most fragmented regions”, containing roughly a quarter of all the world’s known languages (Reilly, 2004:480). A group of people who speak the same language is called a “wantok” in Melanesia ⁴, and maintain solidarity through a collective shared identity. In the case of Vanuatu, the division between the English-speaking Anglophones and the French-speaking Francophones is added to the diversity and fragmentation, since Vanuatu has a historical legacy as an Anglo-French joint Condominium administration during the colonial era.

Diversity and fragmentation in the Pacific Island Countries can be also seen in the traditional social institutions. The Pacific Islanders normally form traditional social groups based on the patrilineal or matrilineal or both kin groups, which function as land-owning units. The traditional social groups have the chiefs who obtain the titles through birth or ability or a combination of both, and a hierarchy between the chiefs and the commoners is formed in Polynesia, Micronesia and Fiji where the chiefly systems are well-developed. Also, traditional social groups are often formed from a lower unit to a higher unit, as typically observed in Fiji. In such cases, the chiefs are also ranked hierarchically from a lower level to a higher level. In the traditional social
groups which are formed hierarchically, further hierarchical relations often exist among
the ones at the same levels.

In addition, we can not overlook that the differences among the islands and
the areas within the island, create diversity and fragmentation since all Pacific Island
Countries are island states. For example, there are differences between
Polynesian-influenced Lau Islands and the rest of the Islands in Fiji, as well as the
western and eastern parts of Fiji’s largest island, Viti Levu. Also, in Papua New Guinea,
there exist differences between the highlands and coastal areas of New Guinea Island.

Furthermore, religion should be pointed out as another element which forms
diversity and fragmentation in the Pacific Island Countries. Christianity is widely
accepted among the Pacific Islanders and it is expressed as the “traditional religion”
for them (Lal and Fortune, 2000:200). In addition to Catholicism, Methodist, Baptist,
Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Anglican, new Christian movements, such as Seventh Day
Adventist, Assembly of God, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witness, are also active in the
Pacific Island Countries. Thus, diversity and fragmentation emerge according to each
sect. In the case of the Indo-Fijians, they are divided into Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and
Christianity.

It is in Fiji that salient racial division exists. The Indo-Fijians, who came to
Fiji in the late nineteenth century as indentured laborers to work in the sugar cane
plantations, have surpassed indigenous Fijians in population for a long time. While the
population of Indo-Fijians is decreasing because of migration overseas especially since
the political instability of the 1980s, they still occupy about 40 percent of total
population and form bi-polar ethnic groups in Fiji along with the Fijians who occupy
about 50 percent of total population\textsuperscript{5) }.

It should be noted here that diversity and fragmentation in the Pacific Island
Countries do not necessarily overlap. For instance, the “wantok” who speak the same
language, do not necessarily belong to the same religious sect. Also, people who
belong to the same traditional social group do not necessarily inhabit the same
community. Sometimes, they scatter into several communities where different
traditional social groups co-exist.
The diversity and fragmentation in the Pacific Island Countries sometimes leads to the outbreak of conflict. The next section examines the mechanism that links diversity and fragmentation in the Pacific Island Countries to conflict.

2) Outbreak of Conflict

With the independence of Samoa (Western Samoa at independence), decolonization started in the Pacific Island Countries in the 1960s. In the process of nation-building, the problem of management and allocation of socio-economic resources emerged as a major issue. How to manage and allocate socio-economic resources properly in the framework of the state is an important role for the government. However, most governments in the Pacific Island Countries, the ones in Melanesia in particular, have not sufficiently exercised the function of managing and allocating socio-economic resources properly. It was because of a lack of so-called “good governance”.

Politicians are normally regarded by their “wantok” as the representatives of the interest of the group. They are expected and demanded to distribute the wealth among their “wantok”. As a result, nepotism and rent-seeking are widespread and lead to corruption over the socio-economic resources.

One typical example is the case of Solomon Islands. In the 1990s, large-scale commercial logging in Solomon Islands was operated mainly by Southeast-Asian logging companies. The Solomon Mamaloni-led government actively supported the logging since tropical timber was one of the biggest export earners for Solomon Islands. Timber made up for 49.4 percent of principal exports of Solomon Islands in 1995 (Kabutaulaka, 2000:91). The rapid growth of log exports caused more than double the potential sustainable yield and the depletion of forestry resources was anticipated (Ibid.). Furthermore, numbers of logging companies deviated from the state forest policies by logging illegally, polluting the environment, and not paying loyalties (Sudo, 2004:176). However, the Mamaloni government did not take any necessary action. Rather, it received bribery money and election funding from logging companies.
and favored them instead (Kabutaulaka, *op.cit.*:95).

Mismanagement and improper distribution of socio-economic resources caused dissatisfaction among the people and created the distinctive awareness of, namely “them, the ones who enjoy the distribution” and “us, the ones who are isolated from the distribution”. Under such circumstances, conflict erupts by taking the form of confrontation among ethnic groups. However, it should be remembered that “we” are not always internally homogenous. Indeed, “we” often contain various differences. Once “we” face “them”, these differences become invisible.

Let us take the example of Solomon Islands again. The conflict in Solomon Islands started in the late 1990s between the islanders of Guadalcanal, where the capital town Honiara was located, and the Malaitans who migrated to Guadalcanal. Since northern Guadalcanal, where Honiara was located, was a center of economic development in Solomon Islands, a lot of people migrated there from other islands in order to get jobs in commercial logging, gold mine, oil palm plantations, and tourist resort development (Sekine, *op.cit.*:70). The immigrants from Malaita, which had the largest population in Solomon Islands, made up the largest part of the migrant flow to Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanal islanders became resentful of the Malaitans who dominated in government jobs, business and industry (*Islands Business*, 1999:18). This resulted in the formation of the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army in late 1998, a militant group which was organized by the resident of the Weather Coast area in southern Guadalcanal which was behind in development compared to northern Guadalcanal. Starting with attacks on the Malaitans, armed conflict between the Guadalcanal islanders and the Malaitans continued until the deployment of RAMSI in July 2003.

In the case of Solomon Islands, “we”, the Guadalcanal islanders, were originally divided into six major language groups from which eighteen language groups were further derived (Sekine, *op.cit.*:70). In addition, as mentioned earlier, there was a difference between northern Guadalcanal and southern Guadalcanal according to the level of development, even on the same island. Nevertheless, these differences dissolved in front of “them”, the Malaitans, and the Guadalcanal islanders converged
on “us”. As well as Guadalcanal islanders, the Malaitans, who were ethnically diverse (Reilly, op. cit.:489), made internal differences invisible and also converged on “us”.

The division between “us” and “them” will change their boundaries once the context changes. This would provide a new cause of conflict and raise the danger of the outbreak of new conflict.

2. The Attempts of the Pacific Islands Forum

1) Participation of “Civil Society” in Regionalism

The proper management and allocation of socio-economic resources is required in order to eliminate a cause of the conflict in the Pacific Island Countries. It can be said that the enhancement of “civil society”, which has a monitoring function over the management and allocation of socio-economic resources by the government, and escapes from being bound to the framework of the ethnic group, is one of the means to meet this purpose. The Forum has tried to implement this by promoting the participation of “civil society” in regionalism.

The attempts of the Forum to promote the participation of “civil society” in regionalism started with the adoption of the Forum Secretariat and Non-Government Organisations Policy Consultation Framework in 2000. Dividing NGOs into “civil society” and “business sector”, the Forum provided them separate annual dialogue meetings with the Forum Secretariat and information on policy issues. It also granted them observer status in appropriate sector Forum meetings (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2000).

The Forum replaced this framework with the Framework for Engagement with the Pacific Regional Non-State Actors in 2002. The new framework promoted more participation of “civil society” in regionalism by increasing dialogue meetings with the Forum Secretariat from once to twice a year, providing contact with the Forum Secretariat staff as mandated by their job description, and allowing participation at
focal point groups to develop background paper for formulating policy and the Working Group of Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific \(^6\) (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2002). Furthermore, since 2004, the Forum has sent the Secretary-General of the Forum Secretariat to the annual meeting of Pacific Regional Civil Society Organisations Forum, which coincides with the annual meeting of the Forum, where they receive the communiqué, and examine it at the meeting (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005).

The attempts of the Forum were further enhanced by inviting “civil society” to the consultations on the Pacific Plan, an action plan for implementing Pacific Vision which aimed at implementing future goals for strengthening regional cooperation and integration of the Forum. After the consultations with “Non-State Actors”, the Forum clarified its stance to co-operate with “civil society” in the Pacific Plan which was adopted in 2005. Especially on “good governance”, one of the 4 pillars of the Pacific Plan \(^7\), the Forum mentioned that it would support consultative decision-making process including “Non-State Actors”, youth, women, and the disabled (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2006:6).

Moreover, the Forum adopted the Policy on Consultative Status and Accreditation between the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and Pacific Regional Non-State Actors in 2007. The relation between the Forum and “civil society” was more institutionalized, as the policy set up the Consultative Status Committee, which was comprised of representatives of the past, present and future Forum Chairs \(^8\) plus a representative of the Forum Secretariat. The committee was responsible for granting, suspending and withdrawing the consultative status of Non-State Actors (Policy on Consultative Status and Accreditation between the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and Pacific Regional Non-State Actors).

2) Characteristics of “Civil Society”

Then, how does the Forum define “civil society”? Let us examine the criteria of

The criteria of “Non-State Actors”, which were set in the Framework for Engagement with the Pacific Regional Non-State Actors, were as follows:

I-Are legally constituted non-profit organizations;
II-Are governed by democratically chosen bodies;
III-Have transparent policy formulation and management processes;
IV-Have a focus on formulating, advocating or implementing policies related to some or all aspects of sustainable development;
V-Objectives, policies and activities that are respectful of human rights, cultures and gender equality;
VI-Having a Pacific regional focus and membership drawn from Forum island countries and who are legally constituted in one or more FICs (Forum island countries);
VII-Pacific regional arms of international NSAs (Non-State Actors) formally recognized by the United Nations system, the EU (European Union) and the ACP (Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific) Group and the Commonwealth Secretariat (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2002).

Policy on Consultative Status and Accreditation between the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and Pacific Regional Non-State Actors presented new criteria of “Non-State Actors” which:

I-Is headquartered in a PIF (Pacific Islands Forum) member state;
II-Has an established presence in at least one third of the member states of the PIF;
III-Is legally registered in a PIF member state as a Non-State Actor and/or charitable trust;
IV-Must possess efficient technical expertise and quality services to support the implementation of regional initiatives at the national level;
V-Is actively involved in the implementation of regional initiatives in service
delivery and/or advocacy at national levels;

VI-Is organized and led in a democratic and transparent manner in accord with section 8 of this policy;

VII-Has been established for at least three years (Policy on Consultative Status and Accreditation between the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and Pacific Regional Non-State Actors).

The criteria of “Non-State Actors” in the Policy on Consultative Status and Accreditation between the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and Pacific Regional Non-State Actors became more accurate and clearer than the ones in the Framework for Engagement with the Pacific Regional Non-State Actors. As “Non-State Actors” which meet these criteria, the following organisations can be named: the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (established in 1984) which specializes in gender issues; the Foundation for Peoples of the South Pacific International (established in 1965) which has been engaged in community development and sustainable human development; the Pacific Concerns Resources Centre (established in 1980) which has been involved in demilitarization, decolonization, environment, sustainable human development, and human rights • good governance; the Pacific Conference of Churches (established in 1961) which includes almost all the major Christian churches in the Pacific Islands; and the Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO) (established in 1991) which aims at just and sustainable human development.

It is expected that enhancement of the “civil society” through its participation in regionalism, which has been conducted so far by Forum member governments, will eliminate a cause of the conflict and expand the possibilities for building sustainable peace in the Pacific Islands Countries. At the same time, we should not forget that it brings about the “institutionalization of civil society”.

“Civil society”, which participates in regionalism, is the one that meets the criteria of “Non-State Actors” defined by the Forum. In short, it is the “civil society” which is selected, authorized, and institutionalized by the Forum. Needless to say, “Non-State Actors”, which are not authorized by the Forum, are not included in the “civil society”.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that “civil society” is organized as a “regional civil society” which is a counterpart of the Forum. PIANGO, mentioned above, typically illustrates this point. It is a regional network of NGO focal points or coordinating bodies known as National Liaison Units. The NGOs form one National Liaison Unit per country or territory and sixteen National Liaison Units, six interim member units which are working to establish National Liaison Units, and three observers make up PIANGO (Pacific Islands Association of NGOs) \(^1\). Thus, “regional civil society” is formed by incorporating local NGOs in respective countries or territories into PIANGO which has a pyramid structure.

However, it does not mean that all local NGOs willingly joined the “civil society” structure. Some local NGOs refused to be incorporated into the structure. The National Council of Women in Samoa was one case. Arguing strongly against the incorporating nature of the measures, it decided not to join Samoa Umbrella Group for NGOs \(^2\), a National Liaison Unit in Samoa (Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2000:107). Those NGOs, which did not join a National Liaison Unit, were at a disadvantage since neither the UNDP nor government provided them funds or invited them to the consultations \((Ibid.:107-108)\). Because of this, many NGOs have chosen to be incorporated into the “civil society” structure.

What relations, then, does “civil society” have with local communities where the majority of Pacific Islanders are living? Let us examine the relations between “civil society” and local communities in the next section.

3. Community as an Actor in Peacebuilding

1) “Civil Society” and Community

It can be said that the local community in the Pacific Island Countries is quite different from “civil society” which participates in regionalism. Adopting the criteria of “Non-State Actors” as defined by the Forum, we can first say that the community
conducts activities in a very limited geographical area within a Pacific Island Country, not like “civil society” which expands activities over plural Pacific Island Countries. Second, the community constitutes several traditional social groups. It is never legally registered as a “Non-State Actor” and/or a charitable trust. Third, the community does not initially possess technical expertise or quality services to support the implementation of regional initiatives at the national level, in service delivery, and/or advocacy at national levels. Fourth, the community is led by the chief of traditional social groups. It neither has the constitution nor issues the annual report with audited financial statements. In this sense, it is far from “a democratic and transparent manner”.

Thus, the community, which does not comply with the criteria of “Non-State Actors” as defined by the Forum, is not authorized by the Forum. Also, it is not incorporated into “regional civil society”.

As mentioned earlier, “regional civil society” is formed in a pyramid structure by incorporating local NGOs. While communities sometimes have cooperative relations with NGOs, they are not under the NGOs in the pyramid structure, thus maintaining their independence. Rather, there often exists a considerable gap between communities and NGOs.

Generally speaking, the majority of the NGOs in the Pacific Island Countries are so-called “urban civil society organizations” (Pollard and Wale, 2004:591) based on the capital cities or provincial towns. It happens quite often that “urban civil society organizations” can not expand their activities to the local communities, because of high communication and transport costs and the lack of associated infrastructure for conducting activities in rural areas (Scales and Teakeni, 2006:70). Even if the “urban civil society organizations” set up the provincial offices as intermediaries, their activities are largely confined to the provincial towns, due to the shortage of funds and human resources. There is a double “urban-rural gap”, between capital cities and provincial centers, and between those centers and rural communities (Ibid).

It is not expected that local communities, which are not incorporated in the “regional civil society” structure, would participate in regionalism. It is the “civil
society” that the Forum considers as an actor in peacebuilding, not the local community.

2) The Attempts of the Community for Peacebuilding

While the Forum has not regarded local communities as actors in peacebuilding, local communities have launched an action for peacebuilding. The case of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea provided a salient example.

Although the island of Bougainville is located within the territory of Papua New Guinea, the islanders fundamentally share similarities with people living in the Western Province of Solomon Islands, which is close to the border. When Papua New Guinea declared its independence in 1975, Bougainville claimed its independence as the “North Solomons Republic”, but eventually accepted incorporation into the territory of Papua New Guinea, in return for a constitutionally protected provincial government system. The situation changed when large-scale copper mining started in Bougainville. As the copper of Bougainville began to make up about half of the export revenue of Papua New Guinea in the 1980s, the Bougainvilleans felt dissatisfied with distribution of benefits from the mine (McDougall, 2004:343-344). Due to this dissatisfaction, a group of Bougainvilleans sabotaged the mine in late 1988 and this led to armed conflict with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, which was dispatched to Bougainville.

The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), which was originally formed by a traditional social group close to the mine, was promoting “Pan-Bougainvillean identity” during the conflict. Therefore, the conflict became the one between “us”, the Bougainvilleans who were initially composed of 19 different language groups, and “them”, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (Boge and Garasu, 2004:566; Reilly, op.cit.:488). In 1992, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force was compelled to withdraw entirely from the island of Bougainville. The Papua New Guinea government then ordered a total blockade of the island. As a reaction to the blockade, the BRA
proclaimed the independence of the “Republic of Bougainville” (Boge and Garasu, \textit{op.cit.}:566-567).

The blockade caused seriously damage to the Bougainville society. Thousands of Bougainvilleans lost their lives because of the collapse of the medical care system. To make matters worse, a new militant group of Bougainvilleans, the so-called “resistance forces”, rose up since the BRA proved incapable of maintaining law and order. The formation of the resistance forces changed the character of the conflict, that is, the conflict between “us”, the Bougainvilleans, and “them”, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, to the one between “us” and “them” among Bougainvilleans themselves (\textit{Ibid.}:566-567).

It was the communities in Bougainville that took an action during the chaos. The activities of women within the community should be especially noted.

Since matrilineal societies made up the majority of Bougainville, the women were in a position to negotiate peace in their communities and to use their influence as go-betweens with the warring factions to initiate and maintain dialogue (\textit{Ibid.}:573). They went into the bush to attempt to bring their sons home and organized peace marches, peace vigils, peace petitions, and prayer meeting for peace (\textit{Ibid.}; Radio Australia, 2004). As the traditional women’s organizations in Bougainville were church women’s groups (\textit{Ibid}), those women’s groups established the Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum in 1995. Uniting women from all denominations across the island, the Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum organized a Women’s Peace Forum in Arawa in Bougainville in 1996 and appealed for peace (Boge and Garasu, \textit{op.cit.}: 573).

It was regarded that the conference was an important step on the road to the peace process, which was launched by the New Zealand government a year later (\textit{Ibid.}). After several meetings and rounds of negotiations which were facilitated by the New Zealand government, the Burnham Declaration was adopted in July 1997, in which the parties committed themselves to a peaceful solution of the conflict. In October the same year, the Burnham Truce was adopted, and furthermore, the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security, and Development on Bougainville was signed in January 1998. The
truce became an official cease-fire in April 1998, which was to be overseen by a peace monitoring group, an unarmed unit of the military and civilian personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Vanuatu. At the cease-fire ceremony, it was declared that the conflict in Bougainville, which continued for almost ten years and claimed almost 15,000 victims, was finally over. The peacebuilding in Bougainville progressed even further with the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001, which promised to grant far-reaching political autonomy for Bougainville within the constitutional framework of Papua New Guinea (Ibid.: 568-570).

On the other hand, the activities of the community for peacebuilding have continued even after the cease-fire in Bougainville. In the Pacific Islands, not only is there the signing of a formal peace treaty, but also the public expression of peace and reconciliation is a central element of conflict resolution, so that the customs and ceremonies in peacebuilding have a crucial meaning (Maclellan, 2004:535). In Bougainville, public peace ceremonies were conducted in a manner where the BRA members and the “resistance forces” exchanged pigs and shells, and broke their bows and arrows symbolically. Those ceremonies were a first step that allowed former combatants to make their private peace with the families of those they had killed, opening the way for emotional healing and reintegration into their communities (Ibid.). It was the community that played a central role in conducting those peace ceremonies and customs. The chiefs or elders on both sides acted as the middlemen in negotiations, and laid down the conditions for peace agreement and the form and amount of compensation, namely pigs, traditional foods, strings of shell money. Upon the outcome of negotiations, a ceremony of restoration, in which the whole community was included, was carried out (Boge and Garasu, op.cit.: 572). It can be said that community embedded the cease-fire among the people and ensured it through conducting peace ceremonies and customs.

It is also noteworthy that the activities of the communities for peacebuilding after the cease-fire in Bougainville have expanded to the field of capacity building of the people. For instance, the Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum, which played an important role in peacebuilding, has shifted the focus of its work to literacy, small
business, training, and capacity building for women and local women’s organizations (Ibid.:574). Those activities, aimed at capacity building by the communities themselves, have a significant meaning for peacebuilding and reconstruction since the end of the conflict.

4. Prospects for Peacebuilding in the Pacific Island Countries

The Forum has tried to promote the participation of “civil society” in regionalism as a mean to prevent conflict and instead build peace in the Pacific Island Countries. For the Forum, a “civil society” is one which can monitor management and allocation of socio-economic resources by the government, without the restraint of the framework of ethnic groups, and therefore, function to eliminate a cause of conflict. In 2003, the Secretary-General of the Forum, Noel Levi, called “civil society” a “bridge between government and the people” (Forum Secretariat, 2003). This clearly expressed what role the Forum expected “civil society” to play.

However, there is another actor in peacebuilding, other than “civil society”. Local communities have also played a significant role in peacebuilding although the Forum did not expect this to happen. It will be an important item on the agenda for the Forum’s attempts at peacebuilding on how to consider the local community as an actor in peacebuilding.

There are two points which should be noted in that case. The first one is the relation between community and “civil society”. As pointed out earlier, local communities have different characteristics from the ones of “civil society”. Also, the former is not incorporated in the structure of the latter. While how to relate the former with the latter is an important point, we have to pay attention to the fact that friction often occurs between local communities and “civil society” in the process of peace building and reconstruction after the end of conflict.

For example, a considerable number of foreign development agencies, international NGOs, UN, and other institutions became active in Bougainville after the
cease-fire and the stabilization of security on the ground, trying to assist in reconstruction and peacebuilding (Boge and Garasu, *op.cit.*: 575). However, those were not always welcomed by the communities in Bougainville. Lorraine Garasu of the Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum stated that they had not been getting aid money for their literacy program because they had wanted to help the people to understand that they had to be self-reliant, not dependent on outside aid all the time. Likewise, Helen Hakena of the Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency, a peacebuilding organisation in Bougainville, emphasized that they had survived by themselves without dependence on outside aid during the blockade by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (Radio Australia, *op.cit.*). Their statements showed that there existed pride in self-reliance which they had been doing, and a kind of resentment at “civil society” as a counteraction, in the communities of Bougainville. It is required for the Forum’s attempts for peacebuilding to ease the friction and build a complementary relationship between the local community and “civil society”.

The second point is about the community itself. The community is composed of traditional social groups. Unlike “civil society”, it is not initially formed over public issues. As shown in the case of Bougainville, the community can also be an actor in peacebuilding, but it is not certain that this will be perpetual. In fact, in Bougainville, it is pointed out that intra-Bougainvillean divisions that are based around traditional clan ties have become more salient once again since the peace deal signed in 2001 (Reilly, *op.cit.*:488). We have to understand that community acts for peacebuilding one time and goes back to its original role as a local society another time. In short, the community’s function changes according to the situation. When we consider community as an actor in peacebuilding, it is necessary to pay attention to the “switchover” of the community.

It can be evaluated that the Forum’s attempts for peacebuilding have attained a certain result in the enhancement of “civil society” through its participation in regionalism although there is room for reconsidering the “institutionalization of civil society”. In order to embed peacebuilding into the Pacific Island Countries in more suitable form to the regional context, it is indispensable to utilize the communities in
such attempts of the Forum.

Notes

1) The Pacific Islands Forum is a regional organization which was established in 1971. 14 Pacific Island Countries, Australia, and New Zealand are the members, with New Caledonia and French Polynesia as Associate Members.

2) See Ogashiwa (2003).

3) See Ogashiwa (2004b).

4) “Wantok”, derived from “one talk” in English, is a word in Pidgin English which is spoken as a lingua franca in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.


6) Other than the Forum Secretariat, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the Forum Fisheries Agency, the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the South Pacific Tourism Organisation, the South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment, the University of the South Pacific, and the Fiji School of Medicine are members Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific.

7) Other pillars were economic growth, sustainable development, and security.

8) The member countries annually rotate the Forum Chair.

9) The ACP Group consists of former colonies of European countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

10) Section 8 stated that all application for admission to consultative status must be accompanied by information of the competence of the organisation and the relevance of its activities to the work of the PIF, and should include the following information:

(a) The purpose of the organization;

(b) Information as to the programmes and activities of the organisation in areas relevant to the PIF member states in which they are carried out. Pacific regional NSA organisations seeking consultative status shall confirm their interest in the goals and objectives of the Forum;

(c) Confirmation of the activities of the organization at the national and regional level;

(d) Copies of the annual reports of the organization with audited financial statements for the preceding three years;

(e) A description of the membership of the organization, including the total number of members, the names of organization that are full or associate members and their geographical distribution;

(f) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization;

(g) Evidence that the organisation has a regular consultative mechanism with national NSA members in at least one third of the PIF member states that the organization represents at a regional level; and

(h) Evidence that the national affiliates and partner NSA members in at least one third of the PIF member states mandate the Pacific regional NSA organisation to speak and/or act on their behalf.

11) There are National Liaison Units in Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tahiti, Tonga Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The interim members are Bougainville, East Timor, Guam, Palau, Wallis and Futuna, and West Papua. The observers are American Samoa, Hawaii,
12) The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assisted the formation of Samoa Umbrella Group for NGOs in 1998 with substantial funding. UNDP also provided fund for the formation of PIANGO.

13) Bougainville Island was incorporated in German territory, being detached from the Western Solomon Islands which were incorporated in British territory, when German, Britain, and France signed the agreement in 1899. Since Germany was defeated in the First World War, it was transferred to the mandate of the League of Nations under Australian administration. The Australian administration had continued under the UN trusteeship after the end of the Second World War. Papua New Guinea attained its independence in 1975.

14) Copper mining was run by Bougainville Copper Limited, a subsidiary body of the British-Australian mining company, with a minority shareholding in the name of Papua New Guinea government.

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