Chapter 4
The Nexus between UN Peacekeeping and Human Security: Reviewing the Functions of UN Peacekeeping from a Perspective of Human Security

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1. Introduction

“History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work.”1 This statement was made in the so-called Brahimi Report, which was submitted in 2000 to the United Nations secretary-general by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations as a comprehensive review of the whole concept of peacekeeping operations.

This emphasis on the interface between peacekeeping and peace-building may reflect the trend that fewer and fewer UN peacekeeping operations are being deployed to interstate conflicts, although the peacekeeping concept was originally invented as a tool for international security, to deal with conflicts between states. Since 1948, the United Nations has established a total of fifty-six peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War (1948–1988), the United Nations created fifteen operations, of which eight were deployed to interstate conflicts. In contrast, since 1989 the United Nations has created forty-one new operations, but only three were sent to conflicts fought between states. In other words, thirty-eight missions (93 percent of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the post–Cold War era) were, in fact, deployed either in
intrastate conflicts or conflicts in a collapsed state (often referred to as a “failed state”).

Furthermore, recent instances of humanitarian intervention and peace operations in Africa and the Balkans indicate that non-UN peacekeeping operations have been established by other international and regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In addition to these regional initiatives, UN-authorised multinational forces have played an important role in complex emergencies in East Timor, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These non-UN peacekeeping operations will not be examined separately in this paper, based on the understanding that the fundamental activities of non-UN operations are quite similar to those of UN operations, and that the operational difficulties that the peacekeepers face in the field are roughly equivalent regardless of the sponsor of the operation. Hence, the following analysis will focus on the performance of UN peacekeeping operations, but its implications should not be limited to UN peacekeeping.

Is UN peacekeeping able to provide an adequate response to the security needs of people caught up in intrastate conflicts? Can the strategies that have been employed by UN peacekeepers address the problems of intrastate conflicts? Even in intrastate conflicts, UN peacekeeping strategies that have been employed in various interstate conflicts are still quite appropriate when the objective of peace-building is the separate development of two newly established entities. For example, the installation of a buffer zone between the combatants helps to demarcate the “international” border between the contested parties. In this sense, the introduction of a UN peacekeeping operation can accelerate the peace process and thus contribute to the resolution of a conflict.

Such a peacekeeping strategy poses a serious problem, however, when the objective of peace-building is the reintegration of separated entities. This is because the logic of peacekeeping stresses the need to create a wall between the two contestants in the interest of forestalling violence between them. As a result of such a physical separation, positive interactions between the parties - necessary to address the fundamental causes of the conflict - are also unwittingly precluded. In short, the logic of peacekeeping may reduce the success of peace-building in divided communities.

This problem is particularly acute when peacekeepers are sent into a conflict in a failed state in which a number of illegitimate warlords and militias hold pieces of the
land, and they are unable to find a mutually satisfactory arrangement to share power in the reintegrated “state.” Under such circumstances, no one is willing or able to ensure the security of the people in that failed state. In fact, it is due to such a vacuum of public security apparatus that the most serious human security concerns develop in a failed state. UN peacekeepers tried to fill such gaps in Somalia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. But recent UN peacekeeping experience in intrastate conflicts shows that strategies of interstate peacekeeping may not be applicable to many of the security issues and challenges presented by intrastate conflicts. The Brahimi Report identified this shortcoming of existing UN peacekeeping strategies and recommended many reforms of UN peacekeeping approaches. A corollary of such an argument is that the strategies of peacekeeping that can facilitate the reintegration of separated entities need to be identified. In other words, an alternative approach that can fill the gaps between today’s reality and the existing strategies of UN peacekeeping must be rigorously explored.

An effective analytical tool that can stimulate creative thinking in this direction is the concept of “human security”, which was first introduced in the Human Development Report 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Later, in 2003, the Commission on Human Security, cochaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, published a report called Human Security Now, which advocated a new security paradigm. In clarifying this new concept of human security, the report argued that attention must shift from the security of states to the security of people. The report also pointed out that the existing mechanisms responsible for protecting the security of people in areas of violent conflict were inadequate, as they drew heavily from state security assumptions.³

Using the concept of human security as a guideline to reveal the gaps that exist between current approaches and the needs on the ground, this paper will review the performance of UN peacekeeping and explore a new peacekeeping strategy that could help to protect the security of people in areas of violent conflict. In particular, the UN peacekeeping experience in Cyprus and Cambodia, where the United Nations was asked to help reintegrate the divided communities, will be referred to in order to draw some lessons for the development of peacekeeping strategies that can contribute to the reintegration of separated entities.
2. Definition of UN Peacekeeping

Before the role of human security in peacekeeping operations can be addressed, the notion of UN peacekeeping must be defined. Over the years, as mentioned above, the United Nations has undertaken fifty-six peacekeeping operations of varying scope, duration, and degree of success. The term “UN peacekeeping” means different things to different people. In fact, many scholars and practitioners have groped for definitions. The United Nations provides us with one of the most comprehensive and authoritative definitions: peacekeeping is

an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the “enforcement action” of the United Nations under Article 42.4

However, even such a broad definition no longer reflects the reality of UN peacekeeping operations. The most remarkable defect of this definition concerns the phrase “without enforcement powers.” The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is a notable example refuting the claim that peacekeeping operations lack enforcement powers. The Security Council authorised UNOSOM II by its Resolution 837 (1993) to take “all necessary measures” against those responsible for the attack on UNOSOM II personnel on 5 June 1993. Theoretically, it can be argued that if the United Nations uses enforcement action to settle a conflict, then such an action is not a peacekeeping operation. This line of argument would exclude UNOSOM II from the list of UN peacekeeping operations, categorising it instead as a peace-enforcement operation. However, in addition to UNOSOM II, the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) also clearly failed to meet this definition of non-enforcement. Thus, the emphasis on the non-enforcement aspect of UN peacekeeping is at least debatable.
Some operations, such as the United Nations Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MINUOH), do not involve any military personnel. This is because these missions are accompanied by non-UN “peacekeepers” who are responsible for overseeing the security of the unarmed UN personnel. Another reason is that these missions are aimed at providing technical assistance to a post-conflict society, which requires exclusively non-military expertise in areas such as electoral supervision, human rights verification, and supervision of public administration, including law enforcement. Despite the fact that people usually associate the term “peacekeeping” with the military, many activities carried out by multifunctional UN peacekeeping operations are, in fact, characterised as a concerted effort between military, police, and other civilian actors. Furthermore, as indicated above, some UN peacekeeping operations do not involve any military personnel.

The difficulty of finding an adequate definition of UN peacekeeping is largely due to the nature and historical roots of peacekeeping. First, because each UN peacekeeping operation is responsive to each particular conflict situation, and every conflict has its own unique character and dynamics, no two operations share identical traits. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that the strength of UN peacekeeping operations lies in their creative and spontaneous adaptation of general principles to a specific situation. Hence, UN peacekeeping has avoided institutionalisation. Second, since UN peacekeeping operations were not originally envisaged in the UN Charter as among the measures designed to preserve international peace and security, they are a purely empirical creation born of necessity. UN peacekeeping emerged during the Cold War as an ad hoc improvisation. As a result, its practice preceded the conceptualisation. The concept of UN peacekeeping has been empirically developed and a general theoretical framework of UN peacekeeping has emerged after repeated trial and error in the field. In short, it is “an evolving concept”.

Because it is still evolving, the practice of UN peacekeeping operations is difficult to conceptualise. One useful way to recognise distinguishing features of UN peacekeeping operations is to define related concepts and identify the clear thresholds that lie between them and peacekeeping. Hence, the characteristics of UN peacekeeping will be compared with other related UN endeavours.

The United Nations has undertaken various efforts to maintain international peace
and security. These UN efforts are usually classified as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building. They can be categorised according to their objectives, the means used to achieve these objectives, the players who carry out the efforts, and the sequence of their implementation. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN secretary-general, presented the official definitions of these concepts:

- **Preventive diplomacy** is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
- **Peacemaking** is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- **Peacekeeping** is a UN presence in the field (normally including military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements), and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief.
- **Peace-enforcement** may be needed when peaceful means fail. It consists of action under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
- **Peace-building** is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It means identifying and supporting measures and structures that will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.¹⁰

The above taxonomy of UN endeavours can provide clear theoretical thresholds between peacekeeping and other UN activities, and thus help us imagine distinct conceptual features of UN peacekeeping operations. For instance, what makes peacekeeping fundamentally different from other approaches is its overriding responsibility for controlling physical violence among the combatants. Activities that come under the rubric of peace-enforcement, in contrast, include sanctions and other
punitive actions against the offender of the international peace and security; therefore, they are different from peacekeeping, which maintains the principles of consent, impartiality, and self-defence. Nonetheless, recent examples of UN peacekeeping indicate that it has begun to assume much wider responsibility and undertake more multifaceted and complex tasks, so that its activity overlaps with that of other UN endeavours. For instance, some UN peacekeeping operations have been granted a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter and have involved a quasi-enforcement action, although their major objectives were still maintaining security arrangements and overseeing public security in the area of deployment.

Furthermore, UN peacekeepers have begun to intervene in intrastate conflicts and now assume a wide range of unprecedented activities. Because some UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to oversee the implementation of a peace accord, they take on civilian tasks that require electoral, judicial, and administrative expertise. State institutions often collapse in intrastate conflicts, and irregular armies play a major role in such a chaotic situation. Due to the lack of sufficient measures and structures to provide humanitarian relief efficiently and safely in collapsed states, some UN peacekeepers are given a mandate to protect humanitarian operations. Under such circumstances, UN peacekeeping has adopted more coercive tactics and strategies, making it increasingly less distinct from peace-enforcement.

In other words, the theoretical boundary between peacekeeping and other UN activities has become blurred as the functions of UN peacekeeping operations have expanded in three directions: peacemaking, peace-building, and peace-enforcement. The overlap between peacemaking and peacekeeping became enormous and institutionalised when UN peacekeeping operations took on new tasks such as supervising the implementation of peace accords and election processes. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) are clear examples of the combination of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Similarly, some of the tasks often labelled as peace-building are now carried out under the framework of UN peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and UNOSOM II, for instance, sought to facilitate a reconciliation process, although their attempts failed. In addition to promoting political
reconciliation among former enemies, UNTAC oversaw economic reconstruction, social rehabilitation, and the repatriation of refugees - activities that used to be conducted outside the framework of UN peacekeeping through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNDP, and other organisations.

Furthermore, the grey area between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping seems to have widened. Several recent UN peacekeeping operations shifted temporarily or partly to enforcement. UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR, for example, involved a much larger number of more powerfully armed personnel than typical peacekeeping missions. These operations were authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all necessary measures to accomplish their mission objectives.

UN peacekeeping is essentially a holding action, but its functions have expanded well beyond its fundamental role. The wider the role that UN peacekeeping seeks to play beyond its original mandate, the more ambiguous the theoretical boundaries between peacekeeping and other UN endeavours become. Because UN peacekeeping is an evolving concept that emerged in the field, finding an all-encompassing definition of UN peacekeeping is almost impossible, and any attempt to treat all operations as the same under the general rubric of peacekeeping seems misguided.  

One way to avoid this pitfall while at the same time addressing a wide range of UN peacekeeping practices is to systematically identify the various functions that UN peacekeeping operations have fulfilled. Therefore, the following section will be devoted to the development of a typology of UN peacekeeping characteristics. In order to categorise the differing characteristics and practices of UN peacekeeping missions, the core spectrum of UN peacekeeping operations are outlined by their functions.

3. Taxonomy of UN Peacekeeping

There are as many types of UN peacekeeping operations as there are types of conflict. This is because, as mentioned above, the conceptualisation of UN peacekeeping operations has followed their practice, which features ad hoc adjustments to changing circumstances. UN peacekeeping is proving to be very flexible, in that sometimes it is given the task of simply supervising a cease-fire, and on other occasions it performs complex and delicate functions such as nation building and maintenance of law and
order in a failed state. Hence, UN peacekeeping operations must be defined descriptively in order to capture the diversity of their practice. A good description of complex activities must be guided by a clear and viable theoretical framework; therefore, the functions of UN peacekeeping operations will be used as a guiding framework in the effort to develop a sound taxonomy.

Classifying the activities of UN peacekeeping based on the functions that each operation fulfils on the ground not only helps us distinguish peacekeeping from other UN operations such as peacemaking, peace-building, and peace-enforcement, but is also useful in identifying the differences and similarities among UN peacekeeping operations. Through a focus on these categories, the concept of UN peacekeeping will be defined descriptively.

Various Typologies of UN Peacekeeping Functions

In order to appreciate the actual effects of each operation on the peace process, a specific set of functions that a UN peacekeeping operation seeks to fulfil in the overall process will be used as basic criteria for examining the nature of each operation. Scholars and practitioners have made several interesting attempts to classify the various tasks of UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, the next step is to briefly examine these typologies.

First, Mats Berdal provides an excellent typology in which he identifies eight categories of UN peacekeeping tasks. These categories are (1) electoral support, (2) humanitarian assistance, (3) mine clearance and training and awareness programmes, (4) observation and verification of cease-fire agreements, buffer zones, and foreign troop withdrawal, (5) preventive deployments, (6) separation of forces, their demobilisation, and the collection, custody, and/or destruction of weapons, (7) establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and (8) disarming paramilitary forces and private and irregular units. Although Berdal places the disarming of regular forces and irregular forces in two separate categories, in the following analysis these two tasks will be incorporated into a single heading: *demobilisation and regrouping*.

Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White examine the various functions performed by UN peacekeeping operations and develop another good typology: (1) observation, (2)
conflict and humanitarian security. Likewise, Paul Diehl and colleagues classify peacekeeping operations into twelve categories: (1) traditional peacekeeping, (2) observation, (3) collective enforcement, (4) election supervision, (5) humanitarian assistance during conflict, (6) state/nation building, (7) pacification, (8) preventive deployment, (9) arms control verification, (10) protective services, (11) intervention in support of democracy, and (12) sanctions enforcement.

John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra list nine distinct categories of UN-authorised military activity, which can be summarised as follows: (1) conventional observer mission, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) preventive peacekeeping, (4) supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces, (5) assisting in the maintenance of law and order, (6) protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, (7) guaranteeing rights of passage, (8) sanctions, and (9) enforcement.

“Supervision” (McCoubrey and White) and “traditional peacekeeping” (Diehl et al., Mackinlay and Chopra) involve securing a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and disengagement of forces, whereas “observation” (McCoubrey and White, Diehl et al.), “fact-finding” (McCoubrey and White), and “conventional observer mission” (Mackinlay and Chopra) merely involve monitoring and reporting on these actions. When Mackinlay and Chopra address cease-fire supervision, they create a separate category for irregular forces; however, supervision of a cease-fire between irregular forces will not be considered as an independent category, based on the understanding that the fundamental activities of peacekeepers in cease-fire supervision are comparable regardless of the nature of the parties concerned. No UN peacekeeping operations seem to have assumed the functions of “collective enforcement” and “sanctions enforcement” (Diehl et al.) or “sanctions” and “enforcement” (Mackinlay and Chopra) that should clearly fall into the peace-enforcement category. Of course, it can be argued that some UN peacekeeping operations such as ONUC, UNOSOM II, and UNPROFOR have carried out quasi-enforcement tasks, but these missions undertook such tasks as a result of “mission creep” rather than a premeditated course of action clearly defined as sanctions and enforcement. For that reason, sanctions and enforcement will be excluded from the following analysis. “Intervention in support of democracy” (McCoubrey and
White) is interpreted to include human rights verification and institutional reinforcement.

Finally, Boutros-Ghali identifies eleven new tasks that the United Nations is now asked to undertake. These include: (1) supervision of cease-fire, (2) regrouping and demobilisation of forces (including their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons), (3) design and implementation of de-mining programmes, (4) return of refugees and displaced persons, (5) provision of humanitarian assistance, (6) supervision of existing administrative structures, (7) establishment of new police forces, (8) verification of respect for human rights, (9) design and supervision of constitutional, judicial, and electoral reforms, (10) observation, supervision, organisation, and conduct of elections, and (11) co-ordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the following analysis, the terms institutional reinforcement or nation building will be used to encompass tasks identified in Boutros-Ghali’s typology as the supervision of existing administrative structures, the establishment of new police forces, and the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial, and electoral reforms.

While the above lists are not exhaustive typologies of UN peacekeeping functions, they do capture the essence of different tasks performed by various UN peacekeeping operations and could be developed into a comprehensive set of categories. Since similar functions and related tasks are listed as distinct categories in some typologies, these will be summarised and merged into fewer subcategories in the following analysis. Table 1 summarises the features of the five typologies presented above.

Table 1: Summaries of the Five Typologies of UN Peacekeeping Functions

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<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Berdal</th>
<th>McCoubrey</th>
<th>Diehl</th>
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Categories of UN Peacekeeping Functions

Using these typologies as references, the functions of UN peacekeeping operations have been carefully reviewed and specific tasks that have been assigned to UN peacekeeping operations have been identified. These tasks fall broadly into three main clusters: (1) interposition, (2) transition assistance, and (3) humanitarian intervention. This is not an exhaustive list, although efforts have been made to make the list as comprehensive as possible. Furthermore, the categories are not intended to be mutually exclusive. Single-task UN peacekeeping operations are rare. Most operations are assigned several different tasks, either simultaneously or sequentially.

Several fundamental features are shared by the tasks that fall under the heading of interposition. First, these tasks are conducted primarily by military personnel and are considered to require military expertise to be fulfilled effectively. A common objective of UN peacekeeping operations involved in such tasks is to restrict overt violence by maintaining the status quo and to buy time for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In these operations, UN peacekeepers seek to defuse and then stabilise the conflict situation. They provide physical, political, and moral barriers to the escalation of the conflict by interposing themselves between the adversaries. The presence of these barriers helps to prevent a tense situation from deteriorating into direct armed confrontation. At the same time, UN peacekeepers seek to help adversaries overcome co-ordination difficulties created by the hostility and the restriction of interaction between them. The interposition functions can be classified into the following six categories:
(1) *Cease-fire supervision* means verifying compliance with the agreement by monitoring the parties’ activities, investigating and reporting violations, and patrolling along a cease-fire line or established areas of separation (buffer zone).

(2) *Disengagement of forces* involves the stationing of impartial lightly armed troops as a buffer between opposing forces to prevent the recurrence of crossfire and to prevent minor incidents from escalating into a full-fledged war. In order to create a buffer, the UN operation oversees mutual or unilateral withdrawal of belligerents at the beginning of its emplacement.

(3) *Verification of withdrawal of foreign troops* involves the verification or supervision of the withdrawal of foreign troops (both regular and irregular forces) that intervened in a conflict.

(4) *Arms transfer control* includes regulation of the disposition and movement of military forces, verification of arms flows into the area of deployment, management of cross-border military assistance, prevention of infiltration, and inspection of military facilities.

(5) *Maintenance of law and order* may be pursued by assisting local authorities or by verifying the neutrality of their police force, but in the absence of local authorities, peacekeepers may assume the primary role in managing local disputes; quelling civil disturbances, riots, human rights abuses, and destruction of property; and prosecuting those members of the local population responsible for illegal actions. When peacekeepers are deployed to failed states, they might have to take responsibility for the security of innocent civilians, including minority groups, refugees, and displaced persons. This task is usually assigned to peacekeepers deployed to an intrastate conflict when there is no effective government capable of assuming such a task by itself, or while a referendum or election is held to determine the legitimate government.

(6) *Preventive deployment* is the stationing of buffer forces between two (actual or potential) combatants to deter the outbreak of direct armed confrontation or to prevent the spread of war.

The *transition assistance* functions seek to change the status quo by assisting a state or group of states in executing an agreed political solution to a conflict. Some of these functions require UN peacekeepers to act as an interface between peacemaking
and peace-building efforts, including both third-party consultancy and socioeconomic processes. While acting as an interposition force between adversaries, many recent UN peacekeeping operations have also been assigned to supervise national elections as a step towards independence or as a reconciliation process. In order to perform these “non-military” functions, the mission must have a substantial or predominantly civilian composition and expertise. The transition assistance functions involve the following eight categories:

(1) **Institutional reinforcement** includes a variety of tasks that are intended to restore or repair state functions in the absence of an effective governmental authority but when a viable government does exist in the area of deployment. UN peacekeepers’ responsibility is to assist the existing or newly established government in the formation, reconstruction, or strengthening of its civil institutions, including local administration. This role also includes assistance with constitutional, judicial, and electoral reforms.

(2) **Nation building** is needed when no viable government exists. In the complete absence of a civil framework, UN peacekeeping operations take on the lead role in the restoration of statehood. In such circumstances, UN peacekeepers rebuild basic infrastructure, assume temporary governmental authority and administration, and establish a new law enforcement mechanism.

(3) **Election assistance** includes a variety of activities relating to post-conflict elections, such as technical assistance; support for national election observers; co-ordination and support for international observers; and verification, supervision, and organisation and conduct of elections or referenda.

(4) **Demobilisation and regrouping** involves the disarming of warring factions, supervision of cantonment and repatriation of combatants, and verification of the regrouping of warring forces. It also includes the collection, storage, and destruction of abandoned weapons.

(5) **De-mining** is a narrowly defined task that involves mine clearance and training for mine clearance.

(6) **Refugee assistance** includes monitoring and regulating the flow of refugees, assisting in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and other related efforts.

(7) **Human rights verification** consists of investigating alleged human rights
violations against the civilian population in the area of deployment and verifying the compliance of the parties with agreements relating to human rights abuses.

(8) *Socioeconomic rehabilitation* includes reconstruction of the war-torn economy, reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, and provision of security for the reestablishment of the economic life of local populations affected by the conflict.

The primary concern of the *humanitarian intervention* functions is to ease human suffering. These functions relate to the immediate needs of victims of natural or political disasters. To achieve the goal of easing human suffering, the use of force has been authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter for some UN peacekeeping operations. Unlike peace-enforcement forces, however, UN peacekeepers seek to remain impartial toward the warring parties and they do not aim to challenge the overall political situation that might have caused the human suffering they are attempting to alleviate. Instead, they seek to defend victims of the conflict—such as innocent civilians, refugees, and displaced persons—from devastation by protecting humanitarian relief operations or creating UN-protected areas. The *humanitarian intervention* functions are grouped into the following two categories:

1. *Securing humanitarian assistance* involves protection of the delivery of humanitarian aid carried out by unarmed civilian organisations and the provision of humanitarian aid to a threatened population in co-ordination with them. These tasks require armed troops to establish a protected area or corridors for the passage of aid, and to escort convoys of humanitarian aid.

2. *Protective services* include the establishment and protection of “security zones” or “safe-areas,” enforcing “no-fly zones,” guaranteeing rights of passage for the purpose of protecting or denying hostile access to threatened civilian populations or areas of a state. UN peacekeepers are also assigned to protect UN and NGO personnel and equipment.

The concept of UN peacekeeping has been defined descriptively, and a wide range of functions fulfilled by UN peacekeeping operations has been systematically identified. In order to critically review the performance of UN peacekeeping and to evaluate its
potential as a catalyst for reintegrating divided communities, the concept of human security will be addressed in the next section.

Table 2: Key Clusters of UN Peacekeeping Functions

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<th>Transition Assistance</th>
<th>Humanitarian Intervention</th>
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<td>Cease-fire Supervision</td>
<td>Institutional Reinforcement</td>
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The Human Security Now report has identified a number of gaps in today’s post-conflict strategies. These gaps can be categorised into four groups: (1) security gaps, (2) governance gaps, (3) gaps in international response, and (4) resource gaps. While it is impossible to fill all the gaps identified in the report by improving the practice of UN peacekeeping, it seems reasonable to review the performance of current peacekeeping strategies in intrastate conflicts by examining the security gaps. This is because one of the most fundamental functions of UN peacekeeping operations is to provide and/or maintain security in the target area. Hence, the functions of UN peacekeeping are reviewed below, using a set of security gaps as an analytical framework.

Security Gap 1: Military troops deployed to separate combatants are frequently ill equipped to deal with public security issues such as civil unrest, crime, and trafficking in human beings.
This gap implies that the institutional capacity for maintaining not only military security arrangements (such as cease-fires) but also public security must be developed among UN peacekeepers who are deployed in an intrastate conflict area. A human security perspective suggests that the set of peacekeeping strategies that is required to maintain public security in a divided community should be quite different from the strategies that are useful for carrying out tasks such as cease-fire supervision, disengagement of forces, verification of withdrawal of foreign troops, arms transfer control, and preventive deployment in interstate conflicts. In fact, in maintaining military security arrangements UN peacekeepers usually deal with combatants, but when they are asked to tackle public security issues they need to interact with non-combatants, including ordinary people and criminal elements; these interactions require different skills and strategies.

Indeed, in intrastate peacekeeping operations, *maintenance of law and order* will play a significant role in the protection of people in a divided community or a failed state. Maintaining law and order in a community at risk is not an entirely new task for UN peacekeepers. For example, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) assumed such a task. Michael Harbottle cites an example of a local effort addressing public security needs that was undertaken by UNFICYP peacekeepers in the Paphos district in 1967 when a series of intercommunal murders and abductions halted economic life and free movement for the people in the region. According to Harbottle, as a result of a number of bicomunal meetings, each chaired by a UN officer, UNFICYP was able to broker a local deal between the *mukhtars* (mayors) of the two communities in the Paphos district, which helped a new sense of security to emerge in the region.\(^ {27} \) This function of UNFICYP became known as “reconciliation through communication.”\(^ {28} \) UNFICYP’s effort provided immediate and practical solutions to limited but urgent problems. Indeed, some peacekeepers are required to master not only combat skills but also what David Last calls contact skills.\(^ {29} \)

Partly because contact skills are required for fulfilling the task of *maintenance of law and order*, and partly because military troops are not skilled at providing public security in communities, the civilian police (CIVPOL) have assumed the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in UN peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, it has historically been very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of
competent police officers for UN peacekeeping operations. For example, in Cambodia it was argued that a total of 3,600 UNTAC civilian police officers would be required to carry out the tasks assigned to UNTAC. Nevertheless, only 200 police officers were deployed to Cambodia in April 1992, and they were still not fully in the field by December 1992. Due to slow deployment and other deficiencies, CIVPOL was not capable of undertaking its mandate successfully. It soon became apparent that it was impossible for the unarmed and understaffed CIVPOL to maintain law and order in an environment where disarmament of the factions had been halted and their co-operation was not forthcoming.

In other words, although UN peacekeeping has dealt with public security issues in intrastate conflicts through the task of maintaining law and order, its performance must be improved. A new set of peacekeeping strategies for fulfilling the interposition function must be developed by placing more emphasis than ever on the task of maintaining law and order. The United Nations has not been able to recruit from its member states sufficient numbers of competent police officers who can perform effective public security duty in conflict-affected communities. The international community must train more public security specialists and establish more effective ways to recruit them.

**Security Gap 2:** From the outset, emphasis in peacekeeping operations is on pursuing an exit strategy that is not directly related to the security needs of the people.

This second gap is inevitable, as the United Nations’ efforts are often directed at reaching agreements on a cease-fire or truce in order to prevent the conflict from spreading outside and to reduce the number of people suffering from the fighting. In interstate conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations are expected to physically separate the warring parties and remain between them until both parties no longer feel the necessity of a buffer force in order to prevent a recurrence of the fighting. Issues such as public security, reconstruction, and the governance of each state are considered to be the responsibility of the states involved, and these issues are not taken into consideration when the United Nations designs the exist strategies for its peacekeeping operations. Thus, in formulating exit strategies, the central security needs of the people within the states are frequently pushed aside, and the post-conflict relationship inevitably remains
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a fragile one. While this may not be a serious problem in interstate conflicts, such an issue can cause a critical failure in the reintegration of a divided community. In Cyprus, for example, the strategy of UNFICYP failed to generate the necessary dynamic for the reintegration of the two separated communities that had been divided physically by the UN Buffer Zone since 1974. In fact, it was the very method of UNIFCYP that unwittingly prevented the sense of security from growing across the buffer.

Nevertheless, if UN peacekeeping operations are designed to provide a link between emergency humanitarian assistance and long-term development, then peacekeeping missions can deal directly with the security needs of the people within the community. The human security framework indicates that the focus of post-conflict strategies should not be limited only to effective peacekeeping but should include peace-building and sustainable development as well. In this sense, the second security gap is linked closely with the challenges that are apparent in post-conflict peace-building, in particular the issues of promoting reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among people affected by conflict.

In the typology of UN peacekeeping functions, such issues are dealt with in the analysis of the transition assistance function. Thus, the transition assistance function will play a pivotal role in a new peacekeeping strategy that can help to protect the security of people in violent conflict. For example, although UNTAC pursued an exit strategy that was not directly related to the security needs of the Cambodian people, the transition assistance functions of UNTAC were systematically incorporated into the Cambodian peace process, and UNTAC helped to create a foundation for its long-term peace-building.

**Security Gap 3: Security strategies do not take into account the needs of humanitarian and development actors.**

As the third security gap indicates, UN peacekeepers do not always pay enough attention to the needs of humanitarian and development actors when they carry out the tasks that can be categorised as humanitarian intervention functions. The logic of the military component often dominates both planning and implementation of humanitarian operations when peacekeepers are asked to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, aid workers, and their equipment. Due to the nature of the tasks, the humanitarian
functions of UN peacekeeping are conducted primarily by the military component, whereas some humanitarian and development activities that fall into the *transition assistance* functions require predominantly civilian expertise. As the military component seeks a temporary solution to a humanitarian crisis, it must be accompanied by a civilian component that aims at addressing the basic human needs of the people and creating an alternative socio-political structure.

One attempt to improve the effectiveness of intervention through co-ordinating the multiple UN agencies at the strategic level can be seen in the establishment of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in April 1992, which was later replaced by the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in January 1998. Thomas Weiss argues that the creation of the DHA was an explicit recognition of the critical need to co-ordinate various aspects of humanitarian diplomacy in New York. Furthermore, UNHCR set up the Partnership in Action (PARinAC) with an aim to improve co-ordination with NGOs working in refugee assistance and protection.

Some UN peacekeeping operations have had a good record of co-ordination with humanitarian agencies, not only at the policy level but also at the implementation level. During the 1974 crisis in Cyprus, for example, UNFICYP, especially through its Operation Economics section and CIVPOL, co-operated closely with humanitarian actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR, and UNDP. UNFICYP (particularly its CIVPOL staff) provided escorts and visited prisons and refugee camps. As a result of the active co-operation between UNFICYP and humanitarian agencies, a large number of humanitarian operations were carried out smoothly and were able to alleviate the suffering of many innocent individuals at the time of the crisis. This example shows the potential of good co-ordination between a UN peacekeeping operation and humanitarian agencies.

Another example can be found in Cambodia. Among the various peace-building tasks that UNTAC carried out during its tenure, the first step was to repatriate the 36,000 refugees from the Thai-Cambodian border. One of the major goals of the UNTAC operation was to complete the repatriation process before the electoral process began so that the returnees could register to vote and participate fully in the electoral campaign. In addition to their participation in the “democratic” elections, their
participation in the subsequent reconstruction was desperately needed for the future of Cambodia; therefore, the repatriation of these refugees was given top priority over the other tasks of UNTAC. Although the repatriation component of UNTAC was given a mandate to work with UNHCR in the repatriation of the refugees and their resettlement, it was UNHCR that took the lead in the repatriation process under the auspices of UNTAC.

While waiting for a peace settlement, UNHCR began training technical and administrative cadres in the camps and inside the country. UNHCR also provided workshops offering training in car repair, electrical services, and welding so that the people completing these programmes could in turn train others when they returned home. To further facilitate the resettlement process, UNHCR, together with UNDP and several NGOs, initiated more than sixty quick-impact projects to help communities absorb the returning refugees. The quick-impact projects included road and bridge repairs, mine clearance, agricultural development, the digging of wells and water ponds, and the improvement and construction of sanitation, health, and education facilities. Project funds were also allocated for the provision of vegetable seeds, fishing equipment, mosquito nets, and water jars as start-up loans. Through these projects, support for UNTAC was consolidated among the Cambodian people and information about its mission was transferred to them, particularly those who lived in remote areas. Quick-impact projects also served to fill the gap between humanitarian relief aid and long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

The third security gap also underlines the importance of the evolution of multifunctional UN peacekeeping as well as the formation of the Civilian-Military Liaison Centre (or Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre, Civil-Military Operations Centre) within a UN peacekeeping operation. The improvement of civilian-military co-ordination within a UN peacekeeping operation facilitates positive interaction among the various components of the operation and is an important step towards forming peacekeeping strategies that take into account the needs of humanitarian and development actors working in the field. By integrating the tasks and playing several different roles in a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations has improved its ability to co-ordinate effective interaction among various third parties. In fact, a civilian-military co-ordination centre presents a concrete way to reduce the
inconsistency and contradiction between the two major actors in post-conflict peace-building: peacekeepers on the one hand, and humanitarian and development actors on the other.

In Human Security Now, it is also argue that “to the extent possible, all relevant tools and instruments - political, military, humanitarian and developmental - should come under unified leadership, with integration close to the delivery points of assistance.”

A good example of such an approach can be found in the UN effort in the Cambodian conflict. The Paris Peace Accords stipulate that UNTAC’s civilian and military components will be put “under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General”, who will designate a special representative to act on his behalf. Yasushi Akashi was appointed as the special representative of the secretary-general, that is, the head of UNTAC, and he reported directly to the secretary-general and to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. The special representative of the secretary-general had authority over both civilian and military components and was authorised to act as the overall co-ordinator of the peace process in Cambodia. Thus, the military component and the civilian component fell under a single command structure. In addition, the executive staff from each component met three times a week (five times a week just before the election) during its operation to co-ordinate their activities on the ground.

In addition, UNTAC set up an Electoral Co-ordination Centre at its headquarters in Phnom Penh and joint co-ordination centres in each province to provide twenty-four-hour combined military and civilian command posts during registration and the elections. While these measures to achieve greater co-ordination between the military and electoral components of UNTAC were not envisaged in the initial implementation plan, such positive developments were necessary for the military component to successfully undertake the newly assigned task of generating confidence in the electoral process and providing security for UNTAC’s electoral units and political party offices and candidates. If the military components had not responded to the necessity of the local situation through the redeployment of forces and the creation of civil-military co-ordination bodies, the elections would have faced enormous challenges.
Nevertheless, according to Janet Heininge, the military’s work was not co-ordinated fully with that of other civilian components despite these efforts. She points out that there was no joint civilian-military officer available to help co-ordinate the activities of the two components, and the co-ordination meetings were at the policy level and did not include working staff.44 In other words, UNTAC still lacked an important branch that focused on maintaining good relationships and co-ordination among the seven components of UNTAC; therefore, although the various components of UNTAC might have been co-ordinated at the strategic level, such efforts did not affect the management of their day-to-day activities.

Furthermore, serious problems in civilian-military co-ordination emerged as a result of the different deployment patterns of the two sides. The original deployment pattern of the military component of UNTAC was based on the requirements of regrouping and cantonment, whereas that of the civilian components was designed to correspond with the borders of the Cambodian provinces. Therefore, no one was assigned in each province as the top provincial director who would be in charge of overseeing all the civilian and military activities of UNTAC within the province. The efficiency of the UNTAC operation would have been enhanced if liaison offices responsible for civilian-military co-ordination had been established within the UNTAC structure and if each province had had a single head of operations in the chain of command.

In short, it can be said that while the need for top-level strategic co-ordination between peacekeeping and humanitarian activities was recognised and reflected in the planning and implementation of UNTAC, the grassroots operational co-ordination among the various components, particularly between the civilian components and the military component of UNTAC, did not receive sufficient attention when the secretary-general developed his implementation plan for UNTAC.

5. Concluding Remarks

Traditionally, UN peacekeeping has focused largely on fulfilling the *interposition* tasks of supervising cease-fires in interstate conflicts. However, when UN peacekeeping operations have been sent to oversee the settlement of intrastate conflicts, they have
been asked to fulfil some of the *transition assistance* functions that would require peacekeepers (including both military and civilian personnel) to engage in peace-building methodologies. In fact, these *transition assistance* functions are the key elements of the peacekeeping strategies that can promote the reintegration of divided communities and meet the security needs of people in violent conflicts.

This chapter reviews the performance of UN peacekeeping from a human security perspective, which argues that post-conflict strategies must include a way to protect the people involved by guaranteeing public security, providing humanitarian relief, building social capital, nurturing the reconciliation and coexistence of divided communities, and restoring governance. When UN peacekeeping functions are reviewed from this perspective, both positive developments and shortcomings of past and current UN peacekeeping strategies are revealed. For example, the human security perspective reveals the fact that the needs of the most vulnerable group of people involved in conflicts have not necessarily been taken into consideration adequately in the design of UN peacekeeping operations that assume *humanitarian intervention* functions. Indeed, the human security perspective can serve as an excellent checklist for the design of a comprehensive post-conflict strategy. The human security perspective places great significance on the tasks that can be categorised as *transition assistance* functions and emphasises the necessity of taking into consideration the people who were overlooked in the state security assumptions.

A good example of a positive development in this direction is the evolution of multifunction UN peacekeeping operations through which a more comprehensive and co-ordinated approach towards peace-building can be envisaged. It is true that the more tasks a UN peacekeeping mission assumes, the longer it may need to stay on the ground, which may not only make each operation more costly but may also delay the development of a sense of local ownership in the peace-building process. Moreover, it must be remembered that the involvement of military units in humanitarian assistance can easily undermine the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of such activities, although in some cases it is inevitable that assistance will be sought from the military side if humanitarian assistance is to be delivered to the people in need. While these side effects and setbacks should not be overlooked, multifunction UN peacekeeping operations that are fulfilling *transition assistance* functions successfully can provide an
official link between the achievements of the short-term peacekeeping operation and the goals of the long-term peace-building efforts. Indeed, such a transition period is the most critical phase for post-conflict strategies, and if transition assistance functions are completed effectively, the gap that exists between conflict settlement and subsequent reconstruction will be narrowed. A successful transition can pave the way for further peace-building and thus accelerate the conflict resolution process.

One of the primary goals of peace-building is to consolidate the foundations for a peaceful society, and, in fact, the concept of peace-building will play a central role in any reconsideration of the function of peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts. Although the number of organisations that carry out a broad range of peace-building tasks often surpasses the number of organisations that undertake peacekeeping tasks, an organisation that is established specifically to manage the interactive effects of various peace-building endeavours as well as their relationships with other intermediary efforts has rarely been included within the structure of UN peacekeeping. The lack of carefully harmonised peace-building tasks (that is, the lack of effective measures to assist in the transition from peacemaking to peace-building) in the functions of UN peacekeeping may be one of the major factors that has impeded conflict resolution in many areas around the world.

Another positive development identified in this paper is the creation of a civilian-military co-ordination centre within the structure of UN peacekeeping. Better co-ordination between the military units and civilian components of a mission does not necessarily enhance the capacity of UN peacekeeping as a co-ordinating body for peace-building activities, nor does it automatically enable UN peacekeepers to provide security for the people in a divided community; nevertheless, the civilian-military co-ordination centre has the potential to become a forum in which various functions fulfilled by the different components of a multifunction peacekeeping operation can be co-ordinated for conflict resolution.

In sum, the human security perspective suggests that a new set of peacekeeping strategies for intrastate conflicts should aim at fulfilling transition assistance functions, thus allowing the operation to provide a link between emergency humanitarian assistance and long-term development aid. The human security perspective also reminds us that upon undertaking such transition assistance functions, UN peacekeepers must
seek to assist, not dictate, the transition process by respecting local initiatives, utilizing local resources, and nurturing local capacity in order to develop a sense of ownership among local participants in the peace-building process. At the same time, the concept of peace-building can serve as a helpful analytical tool to envisage a linkage among the many tasks (such as nation building, reconstruction, rehabilitation, governance, and empowerment) required in the transition process and establish a comprehensive view of the post-conflict strategies.

Notes


2 For instance, Australian-led multinational forces - the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) - were despatched to East Timor, and multinational forces - the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - are now assuming the responsibility for maintaining security in Kabul, Afghanistan.


5 In addition, the United Nations Observer Group for Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), and the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the 1993 Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER) also consisted entirely of civilian observers, although the United Nations does not consider these “official” UN peacekeeping operations.


9 UN Document (A/46/48), operative para. 28.

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11 Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para. 8-22.
13 Ibid., p. 34.
19 It may be true that the tasks of peacekeepers become more dangerous and complicated when not all parties are legitimate governments. Nonetheless, the nature of the job remains unchanged whether the peacekeepers work with legitimate governments or irregular forces; therefore, separate categories are not required in this study.
20 Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para 21.
22 Yasushi Akashi points out this political effect (political barrier) of UN peacekeeping operations by illustrating them as “show windows” (*Perseverance and Hope: 560 Days in Cambodia* [in Japanese: Nintai to Kibou: Kanbojia no 560 Nichi] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1995), p. 41.
31 CIVPOL was criticised for insufficient staff, the uneven calibre of its personnel,
questions about the extent of their authority, the lack of a common frame of reference to guide investigation of human rights abuses, and deficiencies in equipment.


34 Heininger, *op. cit.*, p. 47.


37 *UN Document (S/25719), Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993*.

38 Heininger, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

39 Ibid., p. 53.


43 Heininger, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

44 Ibid., p. 74.

45 Thus, the human security framework includes five clusters, which incorporate the human security issues and needs: ensuring public security, meeting immediate humanitarian needs, launching rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, emphasising reconciliation and coexistence, and promoting governance and empowerment (Commission on Human Security, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61).