Introduction

This article aims to ask a question concerning the nature of the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone. The characterization of the ongoing peacebuilding process in the country is still underdeveloped. The case of Sierra Leone is of critical importance in light of the continuous engagements of the United Nations as well as active involvement of a sub-regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The war in Sierra Leone was a crystallized form of serious problems in the West African region ranging from bad governance, youth unemployment, mismanagement of natural resources, human rights abuses, etc.

With a decade after the official end of the war in Sierra Leone, it is high time to look at the current stage of the country’s peacebuilding process. For such a purpose this article mainly focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding activities. In addition, it seeks to characterize the overall nature of peacebuilding in the country by illustrating the issue of the principle of ownership of local society. In so doing, the article suggests a possible way forward for the country to overcome some destabilizing factors.

Sierra Leone has experienced many externally-driven interventions to foster its peace process. Given the level of atrocities committed in such a small country where historical ties with Europeans are strong, Sierra Leone has been the field for major international peacebuilding activities for more than a decade. Some new concepts like “DDR” and “SSR” were coined and established over Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL was the largest UN Peacekeeping Mission in the late 1990s. Immediately after its establishment
in 2005, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) picked up Sierra Leone as one of the first two countries on its agenda. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) also started over Sierra Leone in 2006. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was an innovative hybrid war crimes tribunal with the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone. The engagement of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone advanced the African security architecture in which sub-regional organizations have distinctive roles to play in conflict prevention and peacekeeping.

All the more because of these externally-driven interventions, however, the issue of ownership of local society is of crucial importance in Sierra Leone. For instance, the involvement of non-state actors in the process of peacebuilding is quite peculiar in Sierra Leone. There are so many local civil society organizations in addition to some major international NGOs having close ties with local NGOs. Not a few civil society organizations have sub-regional networks in West-Africa. They also work closely with UN agencies as well as sub-regional agencies.

It is widely perceived among Sierra Leoneans that there were some positive changes after the war like the spread of human rights norms.¹ The course of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone can be characterized by advancement of internationally recognized values of human rights and democracy. This does not mean that the element of local ownership was missing in the process of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Rather, it can be argued that the liberal peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone has cultivated the sphere of ownership by enlarging the roles of various civil society organizations, academic intellectuals, and ordinary people to decide upon their own government. Most importantly, the ownership issue in Sierra Leone has been showing the difficulty in developing ownership against turbulent and even violent confrontations between political parties’ quest for power. Sierra Leone is showing one possibility in a post-conflict country in Africa to handle multi-party electoral politics, while it is still early to conclude that the country has finished establishing a stable liberal democracy despite harsh party-politics.

Compared to other post-conflict countries in Asia where abhorrence to Western intervention is more conspicuous,² African countries have more widely adopted multi-
party electoral systems and adherence to human rights norms. It is all the more because the prevalent predicament of African polities has been what many researchers call “neopatrimonialism.” In order to eradicate this bad symptom, often through external interventions, African states tend to resort to the internationally orthodox values of liberal democracy. In this sense the case of Sierra Leone is a symbolic challenge of a post-conflict country in Africa to become a liberal democracy though post-conflict peacebuilding reforms.

This article argues that the Sierra Leone model of peacebuilding can be characterized as a typical example of the African model of *post-neopatrimonial liberal democracy*. It is meant to be a form of peacebuilding in which reforms take place in the direction of liberal democracy with the help of foreign intervention. It still appears to be different from long-term liberal democracies sustained for many decades in the sense that nationwide normative and institutional constraints by constitutions are still underdeveloped and that democratic elections are often regarded as struggles between patron-client based groups which seek accesses to state-based resources. It appears to entail distinctively African cultures in the sense that liberal democracy has the task to accommodate traditional normative and institutional settings like clan or secret society based human relations, paramount chiefs, etc.

The article attempts to analyze how Sierra Leone has developed a style of liberal democracy and then seeks to examine current tasks for further advancement of peacebuilding in the country. The first section provides the framework of the problem with reference to neopatrimonialism. The second section describes the background in which post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone became an attempt of creating a new liberal democracy to overcome the legacy of neopatrimonialism. The third section looks at various official documents to identify strategic views on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. The fourth section argues that the perspective to look at Sierra Leone as a model post-conflict liberal democracy provides more insights into our examination of its peacebuilding process.
1. The Debate on Neopatrimonialism and the Issue of National Ownership

Neopatrimonialism has been a matter of hot debates among those who study African politics. The phenomenon is quite often associated with frequent occurrences armed conflicts in Africa, since bad governance is identified as one of the major root-causes of war in Africa by many analysts including Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-General.³ It is now widely accepted that state-building is the key to peacebuilding, as fragile state structures are the causes of war in many parts of the world.⁴ But quite often capacity development is not sufficient to pave the way for sustainable peace, even if it is true that low administrative capacity of the government is one fundamental concern in many countries. Especially in Africa, apparent mismanagement or even abuses of state apparatuses is seen as a hot bed of war. The discussion on “greed and grievances” was also relevant to this observation,⁵ as it is the greedy guys who may abuse state apparatuses by even causing armed conflicts.

The discussion on neopatrimonialism emerged in this context of exploration of causes of war in Africa, although the term itself was coined in 1973 by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. The traditional conception of “patrimonialism” is used to refer to Antiquity and the Middle Ages in which political rule is established between the family-based ruler and vassals. “Neopatrimonialism” is not a form of feudalistic loyalty as in the case of historical patrimonialism. It consists of the modern patron-client relationship based upon the system of allocation of resources through a modern state mechanism. This phenomenon became striking after the wave of decolonization and the massive appearance of many a newly independent state in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. It is certainly true, however, that the influence of political rule during the colonial period is significant, as the colonial ruler monopolized political power and gained resources for their own sake through the public state mechanism.⁶ The utilization of the public sector for the sake of private gains is, even if there is a modern distinction between the public and the private, a typical symptom of neopatrimonialism.

In the field of technical assistance, it is common to use concepts like corruption to describe the same situation. But the concept of neopatrimonialism points to a more
fundamental phenomenon. The issue is not whether corruption is sometimes observable. Neopatrimonialism illustrates the point that the way the entire state institution is managed is patrimonial. This highlights the existence of a huge gap between the theory of the modern nation state and the actual patrimonial culture of governance. Neopatrimonialism is not just about some incidents of corruption that could be improved by technical assistance. Rather, it indicates a certain particular political culture according to which a certain particular country is entirely ruled.

In a typical fragile state in which economic activities are rather sluggish, the private sector is not a very attractive source of gaining more resources. Dominance in the public sector may provide an effective means of exploiting resources even for private gains. The poorer the country is, the more serious the level of neopatrimonialism would be. The discussion on neopatrimonialism is therefore an insight into the mechanism of frequent occurrence of armed conflicts among newly independent states in the post-decolonization world. Africa is a continent which seems to represent this phenomenon of neopatrimonialism. And Sierra Leone was one of the most representative cases in Africa in light of the phenomenon of neopatrimonialism.

Since the time of independence in 1961, Sierra Leone did not enjoy visionary political leadership. Rather, especially after the 17-year rule by Siaka Stevens from 1968 under the one-party system by the All People’ Congress (APC) party, the country suffered from the dysfunction of state institutions. Stevens reigned in a brutal way by imprisoning and killing his opponents or even those who protested against rampant corruption under his rule. A gang of unemployed urban youths amply supplied with drugs was named the Internal Security Unit and deployed as Stevens’ personal death squad. Stevens handled the economy in a disastrous way too. He and his close associates manipulated state mechanisms and exploited rich natural resources in the country. During his reign as president of Sierra Leone, the government ceased to provide basic services to the citizens. Poverty in rural areas became one of the worst in the world. His successor, Joseph Saidu Momoh, was only to deteriorate the situation. Then, the civil war began with the invasion by the rebel group, RUF, in the eastern area protesting against the mismanagement of the government by APC whose stronghold
The orthodox theory of the principle of national ownership is to respect the national government. It is an orthodox doctrine for diplomatic circles and development aid organizations. However, at the time of the beginning of the war in 1991, the national government of Sierra Leone was so inactive and inappropriate, national ownership could not be substantially represented by the national government. Under the one-party system for which even the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) established by the nation’s first Prime Minister, Milton Margai, was once crushed, the principle of national ownership based on the assumption of the national government representing the entire nation was almost empty. Sierra Leone as one of the world’s poorest and most dysfunctional state fell into a further tragedy of the civil war in 1991 without having a proper subject of national ownership.

The history of Sierra Leone before the war indicates the fact that technical issues like capacity development of government officials, investigation into corruption, etc. would not solve more structural problems represented by the debate on neopatrimonialism. The principle of ownership of local society was almost missing in the shadow of neopatrimonialism, which required a superficial application of ownership even in the environment of apparent neopatrimonialism. Sierra Leone before the civil war was a typical example of such problematic ownership as a result of neopatrimonialism spreading over many parts of Africa too.

The 11-year war that started in 1991 by the invasion of RUF seriously fragmented the country. Given the circumstance of neopatrimonialism, however, it is quite doubtful whether Sierra Leone could claim on the integrity as a nation-state even before the war. In addition to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and RUF, there were many other local military groups during the war including Kamajors/Civil Defence Forces (CDF), Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and West Side Boys in addition to Executive Outcomes/Sandline International as the mercenary as well as ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). This complexity of the conflict situation is an indication that Sierra Leone was in the mode of disruption
during the war, but its symptom existed before the war.

2. The Lomé Peace Accord and the War’s End in 2002

The Lomé Peace Accord signed on 27 March 1999 was a peace agreement that eventually paved the way for the cessation of the war that had lasted since 1991. However, it was only on 18 January 2002 that President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah declared the Sierra Leone Civil War officially over. This time lag symbolizes subtlety that is highly relevant to the course of post-conflict peacebuilding. The Lomé Peace Accord gave Foday Sankoh the vice presidency and the chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development (CMRRD). As the disarmament process of RUF (Revolutionary United Front) was inconsistent, RUF began to invade Freetown again. The United Nations was humiliated by the capture of its 500 peacekeepers by RUF in May 2000. Then, the British intervention, Operation Palliser, made a significant change on the ground by helping the government as well as UNAMSIL. The government captured Foday Sankoh on May 17, 2000, which eventually led to the end of the war.

There are some different assessments on the Lomé Peace Accord. Some argue that it was a complete failure, while some others suggest that it was a step forward to the following cessation of the war.\(^7\) This article is not intended to make a comment on the debate concerning the role of the Lomé Peace Accord itself. Rather, it is concerned with the gap between theory and reality of conflict resolution illustrated by the case of Sierra Leone.

In theory, an armed conflict should be mediated for resolution and a peace agreement is a crystallization of such an effort. A core peace agreement is quite often expected to constitute a foundation of the entire peace process in the area concerned. Thus, peace agreements almost in the last two decade tended to contain provisions to specify the contents of peacebuilding activities by showing an overall course of the entire peace process. For instance, the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 decided upon
the various areas of major post-conflict activities with designated lead international agencies. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 for Sudan determined major post-conflict activities with the schedule for a referendum concerning independence of South Sudan.

The Lomé Peace Accord was composed of the three parts respectively on ceasefire, governance, and amnesty. The Accord was notorious for its granting amnesty to RUF leaders; it was due to the weakness of the government caused by the expected withdrawal of the Nigerian forces dominant in EOMOG from Sierra Leone as a result of the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as President in 1999. The Lomé Peace Accord was in fact a product of the government’s resignation for the possibility of ousting RUF. On the other hand, RUF secured its several ministerial positions in the government with a general amnesty, while preparing for further military advancement. The Lomé Peace Accord stood for a peace brokered on the basis of the compromise offered by the government of President Kabbah. Namely, it was derived from the power balance almost on an equal footing between the two conflict parties, the government in a defensive and the rebel in an offensive position.

The events in the following year, 2000, made a sea change in the power balance as a result of the British intervention as well as the Guinean bombing attacks over RUF-captured villages. The arrest of Sankoh on May 17, 2000, was a significant blow on RUF, which later transformed itself into a political party, but eventually could not win even a seat in the parliamentary election in 2002. On 12 June 2000, immediately after the arrest of Sankoh, President Kabbah wrote a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asking the international community to set up a court to try those responsible for war crimes. On 16 January 2002, two days before the official declaration of the end of the war, the UN and Government of Sierra Leone signed an agreement establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) for which Sankoh was kept in custody until his death in July 2003.

This story about the end of the war in Sierra Leone makes a challenge to an orthodox type of conflict resolution. The Lomé Peace Accord, a product of compromise and negotiation, did not really work to end the war. Instead, it was the military
intervention by a former colonial European power together with the operations by neighboring countries, sub-regional organization and the United Nations, which eventually led to the end of the war. As a result, the most horrifying conflict party was gone from the scene of post-conflict peacebuilding. There is no doubt that this particular factor made significantly solid the process of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Compared to other cases of peacebuilding processes where major conflict parties continue to coexist as in the cases of Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone represents the case in which one of the two conflict parties disappears to enable the peacebuilding process to be centered on the initiative of the central government and international forces.

Given this nature, the main focus of the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone was not the maintenance of fragile compromise between conflict parties. Instead, those who had legitimate access to state institutions needed to take the opportunity of the peacebuilding process to concentrate upon the development of a sustainable state mechanism. The peacebuilding process was now expected to eradicate structural causes of conflict. Namely, the efforts for sustainable peace after the official end of the war in 2002 would have to lead to the transformation of the country into a post-neopatrimonial state. The key task of the following peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone was recognized by many stakeholders as an attempt to introduce a political culture of liberal democracy so that the country would not go back to neopatrimonialism.

Under the rule of a neopatrimonial state, the illegitimate monopoly of the public sector was the source of the structural cause of conflict. Thus, the key to success of the peacebuilding process is now the extension of the framework of ownership of local society as a whole over the process of creating a new liberal democracy in the post-conflict African environment. The next section looks at the actual way peacebuilding in Sierra Leone struggles to achieve this task.

3. Strategies of Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

There are several major documents that symbolize the peacebuilding process in Sierra
Leone. It is the purpose of this section to examine these documents in order to grasp the overall nature of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Out of the strategic documents in the initial stage of post-conflict peacebuilding, the critically important is the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The mandate of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission was then set out in several sections of the enabling legislation, the TRC Act, adopted in 2000 by the Parliament of Sierra Leone. The foremost impact of TRC lies in its candid insightful analyses of “root-causes of conflict” in Sierra Leone. The comprehensive report of TRC observes that “the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people to a state of poverty. Successive political elites plundered the nation’s assets, including its mineral riches, at the expense of the national good.”

“Key themes highlighted by the Commission were the pervasive corruption and the dire failings in governance that characterised all the regimes of the pre-conflict years. These factors produced the conditions that made Sierra Leone ripe for violent conflict.”

“The Commission finds that, by the early 1990s, greed, corruption and bad governance had led to institutional collapse, through the weakening of the Army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service. The entire economy was undermined by grave mismanagement.”

The recommendations of TRC begin with those on human rights. TRC then emphasizes the importance of “establishing the rule of law.” TRC states that “In a true democracy there is no compromise on the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law…. In short, the rule of law says that nobody is above the law.”

Then, TRC illustrates the importance of the functional judiciary. “Inequitable law, separate court systems, lack of access to courts, few lawyers, and a confusion of administrative and judicial roles all conspired to prevent the application of the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Courts rarely protected human rights or policed administrative irregularity. The starting point in establishing the rule of law is the creation of an independent, impartial and autonomous judiciary.”
Then, TRC proceeds to make recommendations on “the security services,” “promoting good governance,” “fighting corruption,” “youth,” “women,” “children,” “external actors,” “mineral resources,” “TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” “reparations,” “reconciliation,” followed by “national vision for Sierra Leone.” TRC’s achievement is enormous in the sense that it provided succinct insightful analyses of causes of the war in Sierra Leone as an independent body without any organizational affiliations. Its recommendations still now remain influential.

It is noticeable that the UN PBC is under influence of the understanding represented by the TRC. PBC’s “Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework” of 3 December 2007 illustrated its strategic policies on Sierra Leone as one of the first countries on their agenda. For instance, PBS stated that “The marginalization and political exclusion of youth was identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as one of the root causes of the civil war and is widely perceived to be a threat to peace consolidation today.”

PBC also recognizes the importance of implementing TRC’s recommendations especially in the area of justice and security sector reform by urging the government of Sierra Leone to “Develop a plan for, and embark on, timely implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” while it promises to “Support the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in addressing the root causes of conflict.”

PBC prioritize the following six areas as key to peacebuilding: “Youth employment and empowerment,” “Justice and security sector reform,” “Consolidation of democracy and good governance,” “Capacity-building,” “Energy sector,” and “Subregional dimensions of peacebuilding.” PBS’s understanding is that youth tend to constitute destabilizing factors in Sierra Leone by not being deterred or even being worsened by inappropriate justice and security systems and practices. In order to tackle such problems, it is crucial to promote democracy and good governance with proper implementation capacities. Apparently, this understanding is, although youth is associated with the issue of unemployment, very political in its perspective. Since the essential point of root-causes of conflict in Sierra Leone was analyzed from a political
standpoint as bad governance of a patrimonial state, strategies of peacebuilding also need to prioritize political areas in order to eradicate or improve root-causes of conflict.

This kind of observation was widely shared among international organizations. In a slightly more nuanced tone, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2005 took the same view. PRSP stipulated its pillars as “Pillar 1: Promoting good governance, security and peace; Pillar 2: Promoting Pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation; and Pillar 3: Promoting human development.” PRSP clearly identified the issue of bad governance as the first priority agenda in light of the importance of peace and security still highly pressing in 2005. Then, PRSP targeted “pro-poor sustainable growth” as a realistically solid start of economic development. Basic human needs ought to be met foremost in a country like Sierra Leone. PRSP was based upon the assumption that promoting good governance for peace and security while sustaining the poor and maintaining basic human needs constitute the foundation for any further activities.14

The UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established in 2005 and drew upon an integrated peace consolidation strategy (PCS) that could guide the efforts of the UN system and create greater synergies and collaboration with other international actors. The PCS aimed to provide the necessary conditions within which the PRSP can be implemented by consolidating and sustaining peace and stability, building and strengthening national institutions of democratic governance. It further sought to promote national reconciliation and the building of trust through effective communication, dialogue and attitudinal change. The PCS analyzed the threats facing Sierra Leone under six broad categories: (i) continuing challenges to internal security, as well as insecurity emanating from a still turbulent sub-region (including the issues of the justice system, Sierra Leone Police [SLP], and Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces [RSLAF]); (ii) Challenges to a national dynamic of reconciliation (including the issues of political parties and electoral politics); (iii) lack of a momentum for accountability (including the issue of corruption); (iv) respect for human rights and the rule of law (including the issue of legal reform and institution building); (v) a widespread sense of economic disempowerment (including unemployment, public –
private partnership and investment); and (vi) lack of a national infrastructure for peace (meaning capacity for mediation at all levels of government and society). In addressing the above national peace consolidation challenges, the PCS proposed a number of specific programme interventions like “Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,” and so on. The PCS was based on the understanding that reforms in political and legal systems as well as social behaviors were the key to the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone.

This made a certain contrast with strategy papers drafted by the Government of Sierra Leone like “Sierra Leone Vision 2025” publicized in 2003, in which a broader list of policy agendas had been provided including orthodox development agendas like education, health, food, shelter, etc. Its strategic vision focused upon development-oriented issues like “How to Attain a Competitive Private Sector-Led Economy with Effective Indigenous Participation,” “How to Create a High Quality of Life for All Sierra Leoneans,” “How to Build a Well-Educated and Enlightened Society,” “How to Create a Tolerant, Stable, Secure and Well-Managed Society Based on Democratic Values,” “How to Ensure Sustainable Exploitation and Effective Utilisation of Natural Resources while Maintaining a Quality Environment,” and “How to Develop A Science and Technology-Driven Nation.” The “Vision 2025” document was intended to envision the future of Sierra Leone more or less from the perspective of development. The government’s concern shared by most ordinary citizens of Sierra Leone was about how to navigate development assistance provided by the international community.15

The United Nations Country Team (UNTC) explained this circumstance by stating the prospect for a “peace consolidation and transition to development.”16 Namely, the first thing to do is consolidation of peace, and then more solid development will take hold. The United Nations through the channel of various agencies would be expected to support the government and other stakeholders in the process of the transition from peace consolidation to development. This chronological understanding of the transition from peace to development provides the explanation to make a bridge among various strategic papers. This understanding is well expressed by PRSP II or “An Agenda for Peace.”
PRSP II or “An Agenda for Peace” of 2008 was intended to symbolize such a transition, as the new APC government under President Ernest Bai Koroma took office in 2007. “An Agenda for Change” focused upon four key priorities; “a reliable power supply,” “raising quantity and value-added productivity in agriculture and fisheries,” “a national transportation network to enable the movement of goods and people and thereby facilitate increased investment and economic activity,” and “sustainable human development through the provision of improved social services.” All these are the priorities for economic and social development, and are not necessarily designed for peacebuilding itself. It is true that “These strategic priorities will be underpinned by measures to consolidate peace, ensure good governance and develop an enabling environment for economic growth,” the measures for consolidation of peace and good governance are all assessed as reinforcements for economic development and growth. “Rule of law, human rights, and peace and security are essential pre-requisites for sustainable growth and economic development.”

In 2009, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office with the United Nations Country Team issued the “Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations’ Family.” The “Joint Vision” defined UN’s “contribution to implementing the Government’s Agenda for Change, to accomplishing the mandate...by the Security Council and to supporting the goals and work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.” With the Joint Vision, they “intend to put into practice the main principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness under the leadership of the Government.” The “Joint Vision” illustrated “one overall priority of furthering the consolidation of peace” and “four programmatic priorities,” namely, “the economic integration of rural areas, the economic and social integration of the youth, an equitable access to health services and an accessible and credible public service.”

In accordance with the “overall priority” of consolidation of peace, the UN intended to facilitate “multi-party dialogue and other forums for conflict prevention and resolution aimed at enhancing political and ethnic tolerance, and promoting national cohesion and the observance of human rights” by building on “the exceptional religious tolerance that exists in this country, on the achievements in promoting democratic
processes, on traditional forms of social solidarity as well as on the progress made in establishing modern government institutions.” The UN would also “promote the rule of law, human rights, the rights of marginalized groups, women and children, and to assist in the review of Sierra Leone’s Constitution” by supporting “a number of core democratic institutions such as the Parliament, the National Electoral Commission, the Political Party Registration Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Decentralization Secretariat and the Independent Media Commission.” The UN would also support “the Sierra Leonean police and other law enforcement agencies in their fight against illicit drug trafficking and international crime,” “the capacity building of Sierra Leone’s national security agencies (especially the Sierra Leone Police) in highly specialized policing areas, such as airport and border security, human trafficking, gender-based violence, crime investigation and related fields.”

The understanding of the consolidation of peace as an “overall priority” does not necessarily mean that “four programmatic priorities” are addressed to pursue this overall priority. The “four programmatic priorities” are rather to be implemented separately, although all of these ought to be so with the “overall priority” as a common concern. Out of 21 extension of ongoing, planned, and new programmes listed in the “Joint Vision” document, only “Democratic Elections and Political Dialogue” and “Support to Democratic Institutions” programmes, both implemented by UNDP, fall into the priority area of consolidation of peace exclusively, while many others are supposed to cover it with other programmatic priority areas.

This is even related to “an internal division of responsibilities, whereby UNIPSIL will focus on political facilitation and outreach with local political stakeholders, promotion and advocacy of international standards as well as in developing assessments, reviews and evaluations of issues of common concern,” “The UN agencies will engage in the operational and programmatic activities. For this reason, UNIPSIL will not implement its own programmes but make use of its in-house expertise to support UN agencies in developing and implementing their respective programme activities.” UNIPSIL is supposed to be an “integrated office,” but it is so within a certain framework of “an internal division of responsibilities.” Accordingly, the
consolidation of peace is now an “overall priority” in relation to “programmatic priorities” within a framework of “an internal division of responsibilities.”

In this section we have seen the development of strategic documents in Sierra Leone after the official declaration of the end of war. Although “peace consolidation” has been consistently considered, its position tends to differ in chronological stages or involvements of international organizations. In the next section, we shall then examine whether this understanding of the importance of consolidation of peace really suits the current situation in the country.


This article has identified the root-cause of the war in Sierra Leone was what could be described as neopatrimonialism. In order to tackle the problem of the civil war that arose as a consequence of neopatrimonialism, the international community first brokered the Lomé Peace Accord with the expectation that a government composed of conflict parties could lead to national reconciliation. Then, the collapse of RUF from 2000 onward enabled the government and the international community to introduce reforms in state institutions based upon liberal democratic values, which are expected to lead to sustainable peace beyond neopatrimonialism. As reform programs were completed, the government and the international community accordingly increased expectations for an arrival of the period of more orthodox development aid.

Is this project of creating a new liberal democracy to get out of the predicament of neopatrimonialism succeeding? There are some sources of concerns. The biggest incident since the time of the official end of the war took place in March 2009. There was a violent confrontation between APC and SLPP supporters in Freetown, which led to mob riots. The incident began on Friday 13 March 2009 with a controversial repainting of the clock tower in Freetown. APC supporters torched two cars and APC’s youth wing set fire to the SLPP national headquarters in the central business district. On Monday 16 March 2009, APC rioters reconvened and blockaded the already-damaged
SLPP headquarters. Police attempts to keep the rioters at bay proved futile and APC supporters were thus able to storm the opposition headquarters, allegedly raping six women and injuring others. Over the same weekend, this party-political violence also took hold in the provinces, during a ward by-election in Soro-Gbema chiefdom, Pujehun district. APC supporters attacked SLPP supporters, wounding the wife of the SLPP chiefdom chairman. Clashes between supports of both parties ensued and the election was called off, and was been rescheduled for 28 March 2009, when it peacefully took place, but with low voter turnout. Two weeks later, on 6 April 2009, the inspector general of police, Brima Acha Kamara, announced that no charges would be pressed regarding the alleged rapes in the Freetown riots. This announcement prompted public outcry that the Inspector General is a puppet for the ruling APC.  

During this turmoil, the historic “Joint Communiqué” between All People’s Congress and Sierra Leone People’s Party was signed on 2 April 2009. The “Joint Communiqué” in the presence of President Koroma, members of the diplomatic corps, and the UN Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG), Michael von der Schulenburg. The two parties in the “Joint Communiqué” stated that “Against the backdrop of the recent events, and cognizant of our obligation to abide by the principles stipulated in the Code of Conduct for Political Parties signed by all political parties on 20 October 2006, we stand together in upholding the Rule of Law and maintaining the core principle of democracy, of free debate over alternative policies and views in an atmosphere of mutual respect.” By repudiating all forms of violence and emphasizing the need for investigating incidents in March, “Both parties recognize the important roles and responsibilities that both the governing and opposition parties have to play in a democratic dispensation, and reiterate that only the people of Sierra Leone can choose their government in free and fair elections. The opposition party accepts the overall authority of the State within the Constitution and that of the institution of the elected President of the Republic as well as the Law, while the governing party accepts the special responsibility of the State in providing adequate security to the opposition parties including its leaders and properties as well as political space to the opposition party to undertake legitimate party activities.”
The incidents in March 2009 would not necessarily mean that leaderships in political parties instigated riots. However, associated youth groups are radical in playing political cards, which politicians want to exploit. There is a context of structural issues like youth unemployment behind the scenes. Still, it is also true that there is logic of mobilization of frustrated youth regardless of the existence of former warring parties like RUF.

In the history of the development of liberal democracy in Africa, the importance of this “Joint Communiqué” should not be underestimated. Many African countries have adopted multi-party democracies. However, as shown by the violent riot in Kenya in December 2007 and February 2008, few countries have yet really developed a stable system to run electoral politics. It is one thing to implement electoral democracy, while it is another to institutionalize stable changes in government based upon results of regular elections. It is one thing to introduce state institutions based upon liberal democracy, while it is another to establish institutional stability in running liberal democracy. Where there are two or more credible political parties, it is crucial for them to mutually recognize each one’s role in the constitutional framework they all share. The fact that the governing party and the largest opposition party in Sierra Leone agreed upon each one’s role is of great importance. In fact, international actors including the UN Security Council welcomed and hailed the “Joint Communiqué.”

Nevertheless, the tension arising from confrontations between political parties have not disappeared. With the upcoming presidential, parliamentary and local elections in November 2012, the tensions in Sierra Leone seem to get higher. The incident of the recall of ERSG Schulenburg in February 2012 was colored by the rumor about the conspiracy of the government. There is an allegation from the side of Schulenburg that the government unnecessarily purchased a large amount of weapons, which caused his serious warning. The fact that the departure of ERSG is discussed in the context of speculations in the year of elections indicates the seriousness of the division of society caused and represented by confrontations of party politics.

Post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, taking the opportunity of ousting of RUF, attempted to install an institution of stable liberal democracy. The international
community invested so much in reforms in justice, police, military systems and support for good governance and capacity development as regards handling conducting elections without fraud or corruption. Nevertheless, the belief in the rule of law does not appear to be strong enough to overcome the structure of confrontations between frustrated people. Constitutionalism has not yet taken solid root in Sierra Leone. It is too early to conclude that Sierra Leone has established a stable liberal democracy.

5. Conclusion

In The Federalist Papers, some of the leading founding fathers of the United States argued that political parties are enemies of constitutional politics.26 The US Constitution was designed to avoid harms caused by party politics. The parliamentary cabinet system developed in Great Britain in its distinctive history of constitutionalism is also expected to avoid the contradiction between head of the state (presidency) and party politics. Constitutionalism takes root, when beliefs in core values are stronger than political considerations by human relations. The principle of ownership of local society has the strongest power, when the entire society is united in core beliefs and values, regardless of political calculations. There is a way ahead until Sierra Leone will become a model of liberal democracy in Africa getting out of neopatrimonial cultures.

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1 Interviews with local civil society organization staff in 2009-2010.
6 Thus, Shin’ichi Takeuchi uses the concept of “post-colonial patrimonial state (PCPS)” instead of

7 See, for instance, Marda Mustapha and Joseph J. Bangura (eds.) *Sierra Leone beyond the Lomé Peace Accord* (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2010).


9 Ibid., p. 29.

10 Ibid., p. 30.


12 Peacebuilding Commission, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, UN Document PBC/2/SLE/1, 3 December, 2007, para. 10.

13 Ibid., paragraphs 15, 25, 26.


17 The Republic of Sierra Leone, “An Agenda for Peace: Second Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP II) 2008-2012.”


19 Ibid., p. 2.

20 Ibid., pp. 16-17 and 30-31.

21 Ibid., p. 6.


